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W A. Bogart*

I.

"Appropriate and Just": Section
24 of the Canadian Charter of
Rights and Freedoms and the
Question of Judicial
Legitimacy**

Introduction

At the heart of procedural law lie questions concerning the role of courts
in a liberal democratic state. What is the essence of their function? What
is the proper relationship between the judiciary and other governmental
institutions? What is the well-spring for values with which courts can
make law?
The questions are perennials and will be asked so long as there is
interest in the workings and malfunctions of all aspects of government.
Courts, like all institutions of government, are continually being assessed
on their own terms and in relation to other branches. In Canada this
examination has received a new impetus. The recently proclaimed
CharterofRights andFreedoms1 adorns the courts with new status. They
have now been given an explicit role in determining the ambit of
government power. Their review of legislation and legislative actions is
no longer limited, as it previously was, to refereeing between levels of
government in this federal state. The courts can now invalidate statutes
and strike at governmental actions based on invasion of certain
proclaimed fundamental rights and freedoms. They stand now as a
bulwark between citizen and state.
But what do such lofty words mean? How are courts to reconcile this
power with the fact that they are unelected, unrepresentative, and
answerable to no one. Independent and aloof, how can they presume to
draw lines in sensitive areas, to make difficult choices when they cannot
be held responsible for consequences? Beyond these questions are ones
concerning the process courts should use in making such decisions.
Should they rely on the traditional adversarial model with its deference
*Professor, Faculty of Law, University of Windsor.
**This paper is a revised version of one prepared for the 12th International Congress of
Comparative Law, Australia August 1986. My thanks to Jeff-Berryman, L. L. Bertoldi, C.
Wydrzynski and William Vanveen for their helpful comments on a draft. Travel to the
Conference supported by the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada.
1. CanadianCharterof Rights andFreedoms, Constitution Act, 1982, as enacted by Canada
Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c. 11.
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to party choice and its emphasis on the resolution of disputes between
individuals? Or do such enhanced powers call for modifications of these
procedures? If the judge cannot be held directly responsible for the
consequences of her decisions, does she not at least have to consider
methods for making these decisions which are more likely to alert her to
those consequences, to educate her about the range of possibilities and the
likely ramifications of each?
When a statute or some governmental action is found invalid, what is
a court to do? Courts establish their domain not only - perhaps not even
principally - through the declaration of right but through the fashioning
and policing of remedies. It is the remedy which gives substance to the
right taking it from the realm of intellectual proclamation into the world
of dollars and cents, sheriffs orders, contempt citations, and all other
enforcement aspects which signal palpable redress, which convince the
plaintiff who succeeds that the harm done can be rectified, that there
really is an institution which will respond even in the face of the power
of the defendant and even despite the powerlessness of those injured.
It is the remedial power of the courts under the Charterof Rights and
Freedoms which I wish to comment upon in this paper. The Charter is
explicit in its directive to the courts about what they should do once a
violation is found. The courts must, as s. 24 stipulates, grant the remedy
which is "appropriate and just in the circumstances." 2 Thus it is
clear that courts have to do something about infringement but how
precisely are they to react in a particular instance? Damages, declarations
and injunctions to act constitutionally are easy candidates for the
remedial array Should the courts go further and how? Will the nature
of some violations force them into more complex forms of relief? I wish
to focus here upon these questions concerning the phenomenon of
constitutional remedies. I hope that in doing so I will, in addition, raise
important questions concerning procedural law and the role of courts and
judges.
Moreover, I believe there is a pressing need to discuss these issues. The
possibility of courts engaging in such activity is not remote and vague
despite the Charter's infancy and particularly the fact that s. 15 dealing
with equality rights - a major candidate for complex remedies
- only came into effect in the spring of 1985. In a recent New
2. For a discussion of the origins of s. 24 see: Fairley Enforcing the Charter:Some thoughts
on an Appropriateand JustStandardforJudicialReview (1982), 4 Supreme Court L. R. 218.
3. For a first look at what the territory might look like regarding damages see: Pilkington,
Damages as a Remedy for Infringement of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms
(1984), 62 Can. Bar. Rev. 517.
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Brunswick case 4 the trial judge, after striking down parts of a language
immersion program, kept jurisdiction of the case in order to ensure that
the school board would bring its program into compliance with the
decision - the first murmurings of ongoing court supervision.
Far more dramatically, the Supreme Court of Canada has invalidated
the Province of Manitoba's English-only statutory laws as offending
against the constitutional requirement of bilingualism in that province. 5
The enormity of this ruling is awesome since all English-only statutes
which have been enacted by Manitoba back to the nineteenth century
were struck down. However, to avoid what the Court termed "legal
chaos", 6 it proceeded to deem that all legislation was temporarily valid in
order to allow for a "minimum" 7 period to allow the statutes to be
translated and enacted in French and to "uphold the rule of law". 8 The
Court "as presently equipped"9 was unable to determine the period
during which it would be possible for the Manitoba legislature to comply
with its constitutional duty. Therefore, it required that within one
hundred and twenty days the Attorney General of Canada or of
Manitoba had to request a special hearing at which the Court would
accept submissions from them and intervenors concerning the logistics of
bringing the legislation into constitutional conformity. 10 The Court
subsequently issued a detailed order providing for a schedule for
translating the laws in stages reaching to 1990 and providing for
reapplication by any of the parties to ensure the orders are carried out."
In the face of such a task, what the Court is about makes the workings
of United States courts pale. Here is the Supreme Court itself directly
confronting not an organ of the province but the legislature itself. The
lines have been drawn. Should the Province not see to it the Court will
be drawn slowly but inexorably into not just supervising the translation,
re-enactment, printing and publishing of legislation but also ordering the
4. See Socidtd des Acadiens du Nouveau-Brunswick Inc, et aL v. Minority Language School
BoardNo. 50 (defendant) andAssociation of Parentsfor Fairnessin Education, GrandFalls
District50Branch (intendedintervenor)(1984), 54 N.B.R. (2d) 198 at 201-02.
5. In the matter of a Reference by the Governor-in-Council Concerning Certain Language
Rights Under Section 23 ofthe ManitobaAct, 1870 (1985) unreported.
6. Id at 31. Because of the substantive posture of the case the Court did not draw upon its
powers under s. 24. But it dealt with remedial issues that are strikingly like those that could
arise under that section.
7. Id at 65.
8. Id at 49.
9. Id at, 67.
10. Id at 67-68. And for an indication of the furor that the decision has caused among
Manitoba judges, see: Cramer, Manitobajudges joust over Supreme Court ruling (1985), Vol.
5, No. 13, Ontario Lawyers Weekly 1.
11. See Order of Court, 30 October 1985.
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financing of the lengthy and expensive process as well. Potentially - a
dramatic initiation into institutional litigation.
And, at least, Chief Justice Dickson of the Supreme Court of Canada
has contemplated, in a public address, the possibility of analogous
remedies to those provided by institutional litigation in the United
2
States:1
The outer limits of s. 24 have yet to be tested but American experience
teaches us that remedial aspects of constitutional rights litigation will often
be the most difficult and most important. In a very real sense the 1954
decision by the United States Supreme Court in Brown v. Board of
Education of Topeka that racially segregated schools were a denial of
equal protection of the laws was the easy part. About thirty years later
problems of how to enforce desegregation are still being sorted out.
Similarly, American judges have been expected to run railroads and
preside over state prison systems. Where the vindication of constitutional
rights simply involves the nullification of past wrongs, the remedial
options are quite straightforward. But where positive action is needed to
correct the denial of constitutional rights, the remedial questions become
more vexing. The protection of equality rights is especially amenable to
such complexities, so that the coming into force of s. 15 of the Charterin
1985 may provide further perplexity in the fashioning of remedies.
In academia initial forays into the field have produced mixed reviews.
One commentator, drawing on his extensive knowledge of remedial law,
gives support to invoking such remedies when legislators and
the
administrators fail to act. 13 Another is not enthusiastic, dismissing
14
United States experience as "without conspicuous success".
II. The Evolution of Litigationand the Charter
The vision of litigation in Canada is refocussing. The classic concept of
the lawsuit is challenged as a number of forces assault its premises and
demand that it adjust to a more complex, less individualized, world. The
most drastic calls for modification may result from Charter lawsuits but
several kinds of litigation already question the suitability of the
conventional paradigm.
The common law focussed on the lawsuit as a mode of dispute
resolution centred upon the determination of rights and remedies on an
individual basis.15 In this traditional model, the lawsuit was a claim of
12. Dickson, The PublicResponsibitity of Lawvyers (1983), 13 Man. L. J. 175 at 187.
13. Sharpe, Injunctions and the Charter(1984), 22 O.H.L.J. 473 at 485 ("To remain faithful

to the text and spirit of the Charter and to the Canadian tradition of remedial flexibility, the
courts will have to act").
14. Pilkington, "Charter Remedies: An Update" in Equality: Section 15 and Charter
Procedures(Department of Education, L.S.U.C. 1985), K-14.
15. Chayes, The Role of the Judge in PublicLaw Litigation (1976), 89 Harv. L. Rev. 1281 at
1285 (hereafter Chayes (1976)). For an extensive, earlier attempt to trace the evolution in
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entitlement on the part of a plaintiff and an assertion of a defence in reply
heard by an aloof, passive judge (or a jury) finding relevant facts and
applying the applicable rule. If the plaintiff prevailed the remedy was
simple and straightforward - usually a monetary payment or sometimes
a directive to return something or to do a clearly defined act. If the
plaintiff lost he was to slink away. In either case the court's involvement
was contained and minimal and the lawsuit was a sealed, episodic event.
In certain ways litigafion is changing even within the classical
paradigm simply because it is often more complex. Commercial litigation
is frequently more complicated because of the highly technical issues in
the dispute and the large number of documents generated through
intricate corporate transactions. These complexities result in lawsuits
which are more elaborate and difficult (and more expensive) but cause
only limited departures from the traditional model. 16 More significant
cleavages begin to occur in this area when interests absent from the
litigation are directly affected by it. For instance, in derivative suits a
shareholder sues to redress wrong done to a corporation but the interests
of all shareholders and others are directly affected by the litigation. Thus
statutory provisions 17 have commonly responded to the need to take
account of these other interests by providing protective devices such as
requiring the court's permission to initiate or settle the action, allowing it
to provide notice, make broad orders for the conduct of the litigation and
by tentative acknowledgement and redress of the inequality in resources
with which various parties might litigate. 18
The class action, the "ad hoc collectivity which organizes its members
for a specific purpose and limited time 't 9 has been the focus of stormy
controversy in Canada in the last decade. The Supreme Court of Canada
in Naken v. General Motors of Canada Ltd,20 has rejected calls for
judicial reform of procedures to broaden its scope while simultaneously
pointing to the legislature as the proper body to bring about the overhaul.
litigation in Canada and compare it with the United States' experience see: Wildsmith, An
American Enforcement Model of Civil Processin a CanadianLandscape (1980-81), 6 Dal. L.
J. 71 contrasting the "dispute settlement" model and the "enforcement" model of litigation in
the Canadian and American context.
16. Bogart, Naken, The Supreme Court and What Are Our Courts For? (1984), 9 C.B.L.J.
280.
17. For example, the Business CorporationsAct, S.O. 1982, c. 4, s. 245. For a discussion of
the derivative suit see: Baxter, The DerivativeAction Under the OntarioBusiness Corporations
Act'A Review of Section 97 (1982), 27 McGill L. J. 453.
18. For a discussion of costs in derivative suits, see Wilson, Attorney Fees And The Decision
To Commence Litigation:Analysis, Comparison And An Application To The Shareholders'
DerivativeAction (1985), 5 Windsor Yearbook of Access to Justice (forthcoming).
19. Bogart, supra, note 16 at 308.
20. (1983), 144 D.L.R. (3d) 385; 46, N.R. 139; [1983] 1 S.C.R. 72.

86 The Dalhousie Law Journal

This decision has been excoriated l and at least some lower courts have
signalled that they will obey the letter but not the spirit of the decision,
reading the judgement down so as to avoid it if possible. 22 Meanwhile,
the Ontario Law Reform Commission has issued its three volume
report,23 calling for fundamental overhaul of the law of class actions and
related procedures, to generally enthusiastic reviews.2 4 And since 1980,
the Province of Quebec has had legislation providing for class actions of
broad scope - a defined target for supporters 25 and critics 26 alike.
With the class action there is a substantial departure from the classic
mode of litigation.2 7 The assertion of rights based on mass harms, the
representation of members of the class whose interests may indeed vary,
the assessment and distribution of monetary relief by new methods, and
the tailoring of other remedies - on occasion based on divergent
viewpoints even within the class - and the procedural aspects of the
class action, such as the motion for certification, all mark it as a
substantial break from the traditional approach to litigation.
Yet another strand which has attenuated the bounds of the
conventional paradigm has been litigation involving challenges to the
plaintiffs standing to sue.2 8 Historically, standing has largely been a tale
of how our society has recognized and protected traditional and
established rights compatible with the vision of litigation as a process for
those concerned exclusively with their own self-interest. Thus, a party's
entitlement to litigate was deeply rooted in basic ideas of the adversarial
system. If you were harmed in the sense that a traditional legal interest a pecuniary, proprietary or economic right - was invaded you could
21. See Bankier, The Futureof ClassActions in Canada:Cases, Courtsand Confusion (1984),

9 C.B.L.J. 260; Bogart, supra, note 16; Fox, Naken v. GeneralMotors of CanadaLtd: Class
Actions Deferred (1984), 6 Supreme Court L. Rev. 335; Prichard, Class Actions Reform;

Some General Comments (1984), 9 C.B.L.J. 309. For a long treatment of the evolution of class
actions up to and including Naken, see: Bankier, ClassActionsfor Monetary Relief in Canada:
Formalismor Function?(1984), 4 Windsor Yearbook of Access to Justice 229.
22. See, for example, Ranjoy Sales and Leasing Ltd et aL v. Deloitte, Haskins and Sells,

[1985] 2 WWR. 534 (Man. C.A.).
23. (1982).
24. See, for instance, DuVal (1983), 3 Windsor Yearbook of Access to Justice 411 and
Prichard, supra note 21 but compare Macdonald and Rowley, Ontario Class Action Reform
Business and Justice System Impacts - A Comment (1984), 9 C.B.L.J. 351 and for a review
which praises the Report but questions some of its premises see Cromwell, An Examination of
the OntarioLaw Reform Commission Report on Class Actions (1983), 15 Ott. L. Rev. 587.
25. See, for example, Lauzon, Le Recours Collectif Quebecois:Description et Bilan (1984), 9
C.B.L.J. 324.
26. See Glenn, ClassActions in Ontarioand Quebec (1984), 62 Can. Bar Rev. 247.

27. Bogart, supra, note 16 at 303.
28. The most eloquent treatment of the standing terrain must surely be Vining, Legal ldentity:
The Coming ofAge ofPublicLaw (1978).
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choose to seek compensation or not as a function of your own selfinterest. But absent such harm, any other impugned conduct was simply
none of your business. Whether it was phrased in terms of cause of action
or standing the failure to demonstrate such an interest barred a plaintiff
from the courtroom door.
But this equation of traditional legal interests with entitlement to sue is
under heavy fire.29 In the last decade the Supreme Court of Canada has
visited the question of standing to sue in constitutional litigation three
times and each time it has weakened the domain of economic interests as
the predicate of standing.30 Though the decisions are vague and untidy in
many ways, they tilt heavily in favour of recognition of non-traditional
interests as candidates for the law's protection. And here again law
reform commissions have had their role, with the British Columbia Law
Reform Commission calling for enhanced recognition of "public"
interests. 3' It is no coincidence that most standing suits have involved
government or some governmental entity as a defendant. For it is
government and other large entities such as corporations and trade unions
which set policies and carry out actions with broad-ranging and massive
impact which can affect individuals concerned only in diffuse and nonparticularized ways, ways not easily related to by courts so accustomed
to thinking in terms of individualized rights heavily skewed in the
direction of economic and proprietary interests.
Standing issues do more than challenge us to rethink what interests we
should recognize and protect (though in just that they perform a vital
function). They remind us that many (most?) important legal issues today
concern not a demand for relief which is immediately identifiable with -a
particular individual plaintiff but rather involve challenges to a policy or
carrying out of a policy on the part of large aggregates of power. 32 In such
cases it is hard for courts to pretend that all they do is resolve disputes
only occasionally generating some rule of broad-based applicability and
then as a mere by-product. When the plaintiff comes asking nothing
directly for himself but instead for a response from the court about the
correctness of some conduct or action the court's role in the working out
29. The standing literature is voluminous. A search of the periodical literature reveals some
thirty articles in Canadian periodicals in the last ten years: see Bogart, Developments in the
CanadianLaw of Standing (1984), 3 Civil Justice Quarterly 339 at 346, note 44.
30. See Thorson v. Attorney Generalof Canada (1974), 43 D.L.R. (3d) 1; Nova Scotia Board
of Censors v McNeil (1975), 55 D.L.R. (3d) 632; The Ministerof Justice of Canadaet at v.
Borowski (1982), 130 D.L.R. (3d) 588.
31. Report on Civil Litigationin the PublicInterest (1980) and for a review both praising and
criticising, see Bogart (1981), 59 Can. Bar Rev. 868 and Wildsmith (1982-83), 7 Dal. L. J.
463.
32. Chayes 1976, supra, note 15 at 1304.
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and framing of public values is impossible to deny. There is a dispute but
at its centre lies a discussion of how a bureaucraticized and entitydominated society is to govern itself.
With the Chartercomes not only a changing role but a new starting
point. Judges are no longer the poor relation of the legislatures in terms
of authority, at least in explicit terms, but can now command legal
relationships within particular spheres. There are areas of life into which
no government or its emanations may intrude with the court nominated
to declare which activities should be thus forbidden.
The Charter entrenches fundamental rights and applies both to
provincial and federal governmental activity. It enumerates a
conglomeration of freedoms: from democratic, 33 mobility,34 and legal
rights35 to equality,36 language, 37 and minority education 38 rights. These
are subject only "to such reasonable limits prescribed by law as can be
demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society"3 9 and the fact
that, in certain instances, the federal Parliament or a provincial legislature
may expressly declare in a statute that it or some of its provisions will
operate notwithstanding the provisions of the Charter.40 And when
Charter rights have been violated, s. 24 is explicit in empowering courts
to frame appropriate remedies:
Anyone whose rights or freedoms as guaranteed by this Charter, have
been infringed or denied may apply to a court of competent jurisdiction to
obtain such remedy as the court considers appropriate and just in the
circumstances.
A generous (but not overly) reading of this remedial section will lead
the courts down paths again at odds with traditional concepts of
litigation. Experience in the United States, turned to in a moment,
suggests that some kinds of constitutional infringement are not put right
by a once and for all proclamation of the court. They are so pervasive
and systemic - institutionalized - that the court must maintain
supervision of the remedial process over an extended period. It must also
sometimes actively use its resources and authority to bend the will of
recalcitrant authorities convinced that they will win if they can only stall
and wear down. In these remedial dramas called "structural ' 41 or
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.

Sections 3, 4, and 5.
Section 6.
Sections 7-14.
Section 15. By virtue of s. 32(2), s. 15 did not come into effect until April 1985.
Sections 16-22.

38. Section 23.

39. Section 1.
40. Section 33.
41. Fiss, The CivilRightsInjunction (1978).

"Appropriate and Just": Section 24 of the Charter

"complex ' 42 injunctions, "orders in institutional litigation" 43 or simply
"decrees" 44 - the focal point is not the individual plaintiff or even a class
of plaintiffs but the unyielding institution or bureaucracy which must be
reshaped and redirected towards constitutional conformity.
Again the role of the court, as in the other instances just described, will
be at odds with the classic concept of the lawsuit as the resolver of
disputes, with the judge as impassive arbiter reacting only to the acts and
manoeuvrings of the parties. Here the court will be active, will take
greater control of the litigation and will look beyond the rights and
obligations of the immediate parties to the impact and consequences of
45
the orders that it will make.
If the foregoing is more or less accurate, it still is only a roadmap of
how litigation is altering, drastically altering some would say. It says little
about whether this should occur. At a normative level are we witnessing
the dawning of a more significant and relevant era for the courts or are
we seeing storm warnings alerting us that courts are straying into
dangerous waters, keeling towards the shoals of illegitimacy? What is to
be said about this altered vision which seems to displace resolution of
individual disputes as the centerpiece with a focus on public values and
their effectuation? To answer that question two others need to be asked.
How great, in fact, is the gap between the traditional model and the new
one? And what precisely are the challenges to the new model's legitimacy
and how well can they be answered? I will respond to these questions
within the specific context of s. 24 of the Charterbut in doing so I believe
some interesting points of reference will emerge concerning a
more general evaluation of the appropriate role of judges and courts.
III. InstitutionalInjunctions in the United States
It is not every injunction issued for a constitutional violation in the
United States which requires the far-reaching involvement of the courts.
Many bear a family resemblance to those ordered in litigation adhering
closely to the traditional model. Thus many times the court will simply
issue a preventative injunction forbidding parties from committing
certain acts held to have infringed a constitutional right.46 Or, more
intrusive but still easily recognizable within established concepts, is a
42. Note, Complex Enforcemenk UnconstitutionalPrisonConditions(1981), 94 Harv. L. Rev.
626.
43. Eisenberg and Yeazell, The Ordinary and the Extraordinary in Institutional Litigation
(1980), 93 Harv. L. Rev. 465 (hereafter Eisenberg and Yeazell).
44. Chayes, 1976,supra, note 15.
45. Id at 1302.
46. The description of the three types of injunction is heavily dependant upon Fiss, supra, note
41.
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reparative order by the court requiring the defendant to effect defined
actions to redress past wrongs or to discharge some obligation held to be
owing. Such injunctions are often found in cases of social discrimination
where the harm of the past is sought to be eradicated.
It is the decree which is said to be the remedial form marked off as
new, defined by characteristics with no counterpart in the traditional
model of litigation. Traced by some to origins in the courts'
reorganization of railroads and divestiture proceedings in antitrust in the
earlier part of the century, the core of its uniqueness lies in
acknowledgement by the courts that they must become much more
involved in the supervision of the offending entity in order to reshape it
to conformity with the constitution. 47 In doing so courts are not lead
inexorably to any one set of solutions dictated by the infringement of the
rights of any one individual or even class of individuals, but rather
fashion a range of orders to redirect the entire course of the institution.
This disassociation of right and remedy remains one of the most
controversial aspects of the decree:48 "[I]t [is] impossible to identify a
unique remedial regime that follows ineluctably from and is measured by
the determination of substantive liability. Control of remedial discretion
is therefore an insistent problem..."
The target of these orders is overwhelmingly some institution such as
a prison, hospital, school system or other government bureaucracy or
even the legislature itself in the case of challenges to electoral boundaries.
But the details of the relief ordered can vary enormously. In school cases
where social discrimination has been found, orders have consisted of
some mix of redrawn district boundaries, magnet schools, remedial
education, consolidation, busing, etc. Here the combination ordered by
any particular court has not been dictated by the proven infringements.
Rather it has emerged after considering such factors as the resources
available, the operation of the school system and the preferences of the
parties: 49 "factors ... quite distinct from and even irrelevant to the
liability determination." Similarly, a decree which deals with
unconstitutional conditions in a prison or mental institution will be
directed at a number of issues which are not necessarily related to a
particular violation: staffing ratios, space availability, health, recreation,
job training, sanitation, nutrition requirements and so on. And as with
school cases, habitual critics of the decree have tried to contain or even
47. Fiss, (id at 9) says that a structural injunction amounts to "a declaration that henceforth
the court will direct or manage the reconstruction of the social institution, in order to bring it
into conformity with the constitution."
48. Chayes, The Supreme Court, 1981 Term-ForewordPublicLaw Litigationand The Burger
Court (1982), 96 Harv. L. Rev. 4 at 46 (hereafter Chayes (1982)).
49. Id at47.
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eliminate them by insisting upon a return to tight and inexorable linking
of right and remedy.5 0
The decree as something apart from the injunction of the traditional
model can be traced to Brown v. Board of Education5' and the efforts by
the courts in the years after the Supreme Court's rejection of "separate
but equal" in law to eradicate it in fact. Attempts at the time to justify the
courts remedial innovations were not elaborate. The need to end racial
inequality was the wellspring of legitimacy which staved off the critics.
But even so the establishment of the decree on the judicial landscape was
not as dramatic as some would suggest. The image of judges becoming
"hell-bent on remaking society" 52 has been and is contested.
Supporters emphasize how extraordinary it is for such relief to even be
claimed, let alone granted.53 Overwhelmingly, most cases in the courts
make a simple claim for some sort of monetary relief. Moreover, in the
small number of cases where decrees are granted, they are sometimes
little more than negotiated settlements given court approval. In other
cases courts have allowed periods of time for the parties to study varying
alternatives which could be realized by decree. In still others, courts have
staged the implementation of the decree to allow the institution to adjust
to the ordered changes.5 4 Thus, a court order can start out looking like a
classic preventative or reparative injunction and be transformed into a
decree with varying levels of intrusion only after milder forms have been
tried and found wanting.
IV. The Question of Legitimacy
Such pervasive activity by American courts has, of course, been
controversial. Some assaults amount to no more than a smear of "judicial
activism", 55 ill-disguised attacks on the results. More responsible voices
decry the confusion of roles of the different branches of government.
Thus, some criticism maintains that administration of institutions is an
executive function and it must remain so if the integrity of government is
to be preserved. 56 Another line of criticism fears that judges will enforce
their decrees by requiring - indirectly or directly - the spending of
50. Id at 51.
51. 347 U.S. 483, (1954).
52. Eisenberg and Yeazell, supra, note 43 at 493.
53. Galanter, Reading the Landscape ofDisputes: What we know and don't know (and think
we know) about ourallegedly contentiousand litigioussociety (1983), 31 UCLA Law Review
71.
54. Eisenberg and Yeazell, supra note 43 at 493.
55. Frug, The JudicialPower ofthe Purse(1978), 126 U. Pa. L. Rev. 715-716.
56. Nagel, Separation of Powers and the Scope of FederalEquitable Remedies (1978), 30
Stan. L. Rev. 661 at 662."

92 The Dalhousie Law Journal

public funds thus arrogating to themselves difficult choices about public
expenditures.5 7 Similar criticisms and the responses they have evoked will
be elaborated upon in a moment 5 8 But a fundamental issue which has
emerged is how new is the form of litigation, how much of a departure
is the decree from the remedial phase of traditional litigation. Faced with
assaults on the legitimacy of the courts' activity, defenders have launched
a counter attack questioning the neatness and well-ordered workings of
litigation's golden age to which critics would return.
Eisenberg and Yeazell have isolated two aspects of "normal" litigation
which tend to show that it and litigation involving elaborate remedies
may not be nearly so divergent as they first appear.5 9 First, traditional
litigation may be much more intrusive than comparisons, which put
intrusiveness exclusively on the decree side of the ledger, might suggest.
Such aspects as default judgements 60 and long-arm provisions, 61
execution before trial - prejudgement remedies, 62 and levy and
execution 63 routinely ordered when no constitutional or public value is at
stake - all of which have counterparts in Canadian law, demonstrate
how active and persistent courts have been in traditional litigation in
bringing to heel recalcitrant parties. Thus the proper comparison may not
be between the judgement debtor who immediately satisfies a judgement
and a court determined to run every detail of a prison according to its
vision of constitutional conformity but rather a less divergent One where,
in the one model, courts routinely order prejudgement attachment, enter
default judgements, attempt to locate hidden assets and so on and, in the
other, courts move to a greater level of specificity concerning
constitutional non-compliance only after trying a number of less active,
less intrusive alternatives.6
57. Frug, supra, note 55 at 733; Mishkin, FederalCourts as State Reformers (1978), 35 Wash.
& Lee L. Rev. 949 at 959,965,969.
58. A further point in the American context, but not developed here because of lack of a
parallel, are allegations that such orders defy principles of federalism as the federal judiciary

intrudes upon state institutions from which the federal government generally has kept clear:
Frug, supra, note 55 at 743-49; Mishkin, supra,note 57, 965 at 967-7 1.
59. Eisenberg and Yeazell, supra,note 43 at 475 et seq.

60. See, for example, Ontario Rules of Practice, Rule 19.
61. See, for example, Ontario Rules of Practice, Rule 17.
62. For a discussion of the development of Anton Pillar Orders and a critique raising concerns
about intrusiveness see Berryman, Anton Pillar Orders:A Canadian Common Law Approach
(1984), 34 U.T.L.J. I and a companion article Patiocco, Anton PillarOrders: Facing The
Threat of the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination (1984), 34 U.T.L.J. 26. For a broad
assessment of prejudgement remedies, again addressing concerns about intrusiveness, see:
Gertner, PrejudgementRemedies:A NeedforRationalization(1981), 19 O.H.L.J. 503; see also

Rogers and Hately, Getting the Pre-TrialInjunction(1982), 60 Can. Bar. Rev. 1.
63. Problems associated with this process are analyzed in the Ontario Law Reform
Commission's Report on the Enforcement ofJudgement Debts andRelated Matters (1981).
64. Eisenberg and Yeazell, supra,note 43 at 481.
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Second, traditional litigation has engaged in much more complex
supervisory tasks than the starkness of the contrasting paradigms has
acknowledged. 65 Thus in probate cases courts have engaged in ongoing
supervision as a routine matter. 66 Judges and legislatures have created a
series of rules and procedures for a wide range of tasks supervised by the
court: satisfying claims of creditors and taxing authorities, preserving the
deceased's assets, distributing assets to beneficiaries, etc. If the supervision
lasts for years and if along the way the court has to oversee the running
of a business or the completion of a commercial transaction, so be it.
Similarly, trusts frequently require courts to supervise substantial and
diversified assets on a continuing basis, to evaluate the faithfulness of the
trustee, the wisdom of investments and the appropriateness of dealings in
which trustees have an interest even while alleging benefit to the trust.67
Further, bankruptcy and receivership provide many instances in which
courts have stepped in to supervise assets of debtors either in an attempt
to put them back on a sound footing or to see to their orderly liquidation
and distribution. 68 In such instances the courts have been caught up in
many complex and difficult business transactions and decisions. 69 While
criticisms have been voiced about particular orders or decisions of courts
in specific cases, there have been few serious challenges to the courts
engaging in such tasks.70
But if it is the case that the difference between the old and new is not
as great as first thought, there are still differences. Though there may be
a more defined and sure continuum than contrasting paradigms would
65. Id at481 et seq.
66. See Ontario Law Reform Commission Report on the Law of Trusts (1984) fzr a discussion
of some of these issues and see, in particular, Draft Act, Part VII, "Further Powers of the
Court".
67. Such issues are reviewed in Waters, Law of Trusts (1984, 2d ed.).
68. One of the most famous examples of a court running a large company is provided by the
receivership of Abitibi Power and Paper Company Limited, a large pulp and paper company
which was in receivership for fourteen years during the 1930's and 40's. Through that period
the company continued to operate but various significant organizational steps were undertaken
under court supervision: see Johnston, "Receivers" in Remedies (1961, Special Lectures of the
Law Society of Upper Canada) 101, 125.
69. Id at 125.
70. See Sharpe, Injunctionsand Specific Performance (1983), 23. Sharpe suggests that there
are many circumstances in a wide variety of lawsuits where the courts engage in "regulation
and management of the litigant's affairs":
In family law, custody and access orders are subject to ongoing review. Maintenance
orders involve not only the imposition on the defendant of an ongoing obligation of
indefinite duration, but also the reservation of the power to alter the nature of that
obligation should circumstances change. In the commercial area, orders appointing
receivers directly involve the court in the management of the most complex business
arrangements. Similarly, the jurisdiction to protect infants and the mentally incompetent
often involves repeated application to the court for directions, as does the more familiar
jurisdiction concerning the administration of estates and trusts.
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indicate, nevertheless, at one end there are judges presiding over busing
and classroom sizes for school children and meals and showers for
inmates. Why are such procedures attacked as illegitimate and why are
they supported as "stirring, the deep and durable demand for justice in
our society". 7T
The core of the criticisms concerning decrees is the extent to which
they and the lawsuits which generate them depart from the function of
courts in resolving disputes between private parties on a one-on-one
basis. It is no coincidence that those who have reservations about such
elaborate remedies under s. 24 re likely to have similar reservations
about other forms of litigation such as class actions or suits
in which standing is claimed for a non-traditional legal interest which
also challenges the traditional model. It is this claim of the traditional one
to a pre-emptive normative role which feeds doubts concerning structural
72
injunctions.
The first line of criticism looks directly to success or failure of these
orders. At bottom the argument, typified by Horowitz, is that courts
should resolve bi-polar disputes because that is what courts do best and,
conversely, when they attempt to reform institutions through decrees,
there is a significant possibility of error both in defining what the rights
are in this context and in bringing obstinate entities to heel and there is
the fear that courts will become mired in the attempt. 73 These critics point
to a set of characteristics of adjudication which make it well-suited to the
protection of the individual and his personal rights and ill-suited to other
tasks involving broad and prospective orders. 74
Defenders, notably Fiss, respond to this by asserting that although the
complexity of structural litigation may increase the likelihood of error, a
proper evaluation must also weigh the positive impact when it succeeds. 75
71. Chayes 1976,supra,note 15 at 1316.
72. Fiss, The Supreme Court 1978 Term - Foreword.The Forms of Justice (1979), 93 Harv.
L. Rev. I (hereafter Fiss 1979), 36:
What has changed is social structure, the emergence of a society dominated by the
operation of large-scale organizations, and it is these changes in social structure that account
for the changes over time in adjudicatoryforms.Such changes should hardly be a cause for
concern. What would, in fact, provoke a genuine crisis of legitimacy would be to insist on
procedural modes shaped in a different social setting, to assume that adjudicatory forms
created centuries ago should control today.
See also Wildsmith, supra,note 15.

73. David Horowitz, The Courts andSocialPolicy (1977).
74. Id see particularly Ch. Two "Attributes of Adjudication." And for a protest against class
actions in Canada striking the same note see: Glenn, supra,note 26 at 270 ("The judiciary thus
is requested to act on behalf of people who have not requested judicial intervention, to give
judgement in the absence of proof of the requisite elements of each class member's claim, to
thereby presume commonality in the sense of general though unproved characteristics").
75. Fiss, supra,note 72 at 32.
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Because of its breadth, a decree, if only partially successful, may tower
above a string of individual suits and may eliminate the need for them
altogether. Moreover, defenders point to the fact that there is no other
institution which can perform the tasks of the courts in this area.
Suggestions for using some hybrid of administrative agencies are
dismissed. 76 Their closeness to government brands them as ill-suited for
the enterprise. It is the very independence and obligation of judges to
publicly respond to a claim of constitutional entitlement which makes
them best suited to engage in the perilous enterprise, one which most
defenders would have them undertake only after all other avenues have
been tried by both plaintiffs and the court. 77
A second tack lies in the threat decrees pose to the power of the purse.
In institutional cases the relief ordered by its nature is often more costly
than any remedy that would be granted on a one-on-one basis. Some
courts refuse to order defendants in these cases to raise funds to comply 78
but others reject lack of money as excusing violation of constitutional
standards thus forcing allocations of public money. 79 A mild form of the
argument, which does not seek to invalidate all decrees on this ground
but to simply sound a note of caution, would have courts consider the
financial ramifications when choosing among the remedial array
available to them in any particular case. 80 More drastic is the variant
which argues that the scope of decrees should be severely circumscribed
by a fundamental precept that the raising and spending of money is
8
exclusively for the legislature. '
That attack is rebuffed by the fact that virtually every court order
directly or indirectly affects allocation of private or public resources. 82
While it is true that ordering busing, or requiring fewer inmates in a cell
may more obviously cause expenditures so too will damage awards
sometimes on a scale more threatening than any decree. Even when
orders are made for non-monetary relief, they can cause substantial
allocative shifts.
76. Id 33.
77. Chayes 1976, supra, note 15 at 1307-09.
78. For example, Jones v. Wittenberg,323 F. Supp. 93 (N. D. Ohio 1971); 330 F. Supp. 707,
712 (N. D. Ohio 1971) affd sub nom Jones v. Me4ger 456 F. 2d 854 (6th Cir. 1972);
Hamilton v. Love, 328 E Supp. 1182, 1194 (E. D. Ark. 1971). But compare Griffin v. County
School Bd 377 U.S. 218, 233 (1963); Virginia v. West Virginia 246 U.S. 565 (1918); Reed
v. Rhodes, 455 R Supp. 569, 606 (N. D. Ohio 1978); Evans v. Buchanan; 447 F Supp. 982,
1026-35 (D. Del.), affd 582 F.2d 750 (3d Cir. 1978) (en banc).
79. For example, Finney v. Arkansas Bd of Correction 505 F. 2d 194, 201 (8th Cir. 1974);
Lora v. Board of Education 456 F Supp. 1211, 1292-93 (E.D.N.Y 1978) Vest v. Lubbock
County Comm.'s Court,444 E Supp. 824,834 (N. D. Tex 1977).
80. Frug, supra,note 55 at 773-84.
81. Id 788; Mishkin, supra,note 57 at 970-71.
82. Eisenberg and Yeazell, supra,note 43 at 507.
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Consider, in the Canadian context, the fashioning of the doctrine of
fairness and the extent to which it increased the range of circumstances
requiring public officials to provide opportunities to reply to official
action. 3 This has imposed a burden on administrative agencies which has
surely caused a significant displacement of resources. But because
invocation of the fairness doctrine takes place within the determination of
the rights of individuals, courts and observers are much less aware of such
fiscal consequences or can simply turn a blind eye. Thus supporters of
institutional litigation do not deny that the cost of a decree should be
taken into account when fashioning it or pursuing its enforcement. They
simply maintain that the fact that public funds are spent in consequence
of such an order does not create a clear distinction between structural
injunctions and any other relief and is not grounds for their invalidation.
A third line of criticism points to the lack of consent of the people.84
Historically, consent was given to courts to solve disputes between
individual parties but the governed have never consented to institutional
litigation.85 Thus such litigation strikes at the pact by which we order
ourselves, taking courts into realms not agreed to in our system of
86
government.
To this there have been a number of responses. First, as outlined
earlier, Eisenberg and Yeazell have challenged the accuracy of the claim
that all that courts did historically was consistent with the traditional
paradigm. 87 Thus early trust, receivership, antitrust and bankruptcy cases
83. Its introduction into Canada took place in Re Nicholson and Haldimand-NorfolkRegional
Boardof CommissionersofPolice (1979), 88 D. L. R. (3d) 671 (S.C.C.). The fairness literature
is vast: see, for example, MacDonald Judicial Review and Procedural Fairness in
AdministrativeLaw (1979/80), 25 McGill L.J. 520 and (1981), 26 McGill L. J. I.
84. See Shapiro, Courts A Comparative and PoliticalAnalysis (1981) for an elaboration of
how pervasive is consent for the dispute resolution function of courts regardless of the society.
85. For a description of the contrasts between the traditional form of litigation and the new
model, see Scott, Two Models of the CivilProcess(1975), 27 Stan. L. Rev. 937 and Wildsmith,
supra, note 15 at 72 ("[Tlhe rational student of civil process must pay heed to American
developments".)
86. For an eloquent protest, in the context of standing, against judges overriding the traditional
model of litigation dedicated to vindicating individual and concrete rights and thereby
engaging in paternalism, see: Brilmayer, The Jurisprudenceof Article II. Perspectives on the
'Caseor Controversy'Requirement(1979), 93 Harv. L. Rev. 297. For a reply see: Tushnet, The
Sociology of Article IM.A Response to ProfessorBrilmayer (1980), 93 Harv. L. Rev. 1698.
And for a rejoinder see: Brilmayer, A Reply (1980), 93 Harv. L. Rev. 1727.
87. Eisenberg and Yeazell, supra,note 43 and see Shapiro supra, note 84 at 1:
Students of courts have generally employed an ideal type, or really a prototype, of courts
involving (1) an independent judge applying (2) pre-existing legal norms after (3) adversary
proceedings in order to achieve (4) a dichotomous decision in which one of the parties was
assigned the legal right and the other found wrong. The growth of political jurisprudence
has been characterized largely by the discovery and emphasis of deviations from the
prototype found in the behaviour of particular courts, showing how uncourtlike courts are
or how much they are like other political actors.
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might all suggest antecedents to structural litigation. Second, Chayes has
argued that consent to this form of litigation, if it has not been given, can
be earned. Thus, it should be given an experimental period to operate. As
it is successful it will merit a claim to legitimacy. 88
Third, Fiss has questioned the consent theory itself.8 9 One aspect of this
challenge is to ask what consent to the dispute resolution model means in
this context. Have the people consented to the form or the function or
certain substantive results? The consent theory has never elaborated upon
any of these questions but merely relies upon the existence of dispute
resolution at the earliest stages of government to give that form a prior
normative claim.90
The most fundamental question is whether consent - clearly
necessary for the legitimacy of the totality of democratic government is always vital for the legitimacy of particular parts. Fiss has argued that
courts' legitimacy depends not on implied or explicit consent of the
people but rather on their competence - "the special contribution they
make to the quality of our social life." 91 Thus, while some institutions like
legislatures, city councils, or school boards have a more direct connection
to consent - they are controlled by the power of the ballot - no such
direct connection can be insisted upon for the courts. The people may
approve or disapprove of what the courts do but they can be permitted
no more immediate control than that. Otherwise the independence of the
judiciary in interpreting and carrying out the constitution would be
92
destroyed.
A fourth challenge focusses upon the necessity of according the
individual an opportunity to participate in any decision which affects him
or her directly. This need for individual participation was celebrated most
prominently by Fuller.93 Structural litigation offends this basic premise
not because it denies representation but because it shifts the focus of that
representation from individuals to groups and organizations. It is also
objectionable because it would require a judge to engage in polycentric
tasks - something, Fuller proclaimed, courts could not do or, in any
event, do well.
While Fuller never offered a clear definition of polycentrism, it seems
to refer to an issue which is many faceted - he used the image of a
88. Chayes 1976,supra, note 15.
89. Fiss 1979, supra note 72 at 36.
90. Id
91. Id. at 38.
92. ld at 31 ("[The judge is] empowered by the political agencies to enforce and create
society-wide norms, and perhaps even to restructure institutions, as a way, I suggest, of giving
meaning to our public values").
93. Fuller, The Forms andLimits ofAdjudication (1978), 92 Harv. L. R. 353.
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spider's web - so that any solution of one aspect must have
ramifications for all others.94 And running any institution - welfare
agency, hospital, school - could be seen, in that sense, as polycentric
since the task is not to focus upon any individual violations but to restore
the entire entity to constitutional conformity. Related concerns have been
raised by Glenn in his attack upon class actions in Canada. 95 Ours is a
system "tolerant of uncompromising struggle" between "true
adversaries". 96 Thus for Glenn, its resources should be dedicated only to
individuals who have actually elected to sue to vindicate their rights and
should be denied to forms which attempt to deviate from this central task.
These criticisms are responded to at several levels. While Fuller is seen
as right in celebrating the connection between reason and adjudication,
the relationship between adjudication and participation of the individual
as an axiom is challenged. Fiss suggests that taken to its full implications,
polycentrism would exclude all adjudication which created rules of law
- public norms - whether constitutional or otherwise. 97 Most of the
important rules of law - fellow-servant, doctrine of fairness,
contributory negligence, hearsay rule and exceptions - have come from
a process that is polycentric, that is, these doctrines have been formulated
from an array of possible solutions. Such doctrines affect all who are
subject to them and yet were formulated without an opportunity for all
related interests to participate. But because there was a "live" plaintiff and
a "live" defendant, the courts could simply turn a blind eye to the direct
and immediate impact on so many others not before them.
Moreover, allowing the need for individual participation its full head
would result in the triumph of form over substance. While seeming to
exalt the individual, it leaves him victim to entities not organized around
the single person but dedicated to mass power. Thus, the predicate of
individual participation buttressed by polycentrism, while formally
celebrating the value of each one of us, forbids access to courts on a basis
- perhaps the only effective basis - on which institutions which
98
threaten that individuality can be challenged.
V. Conclusion:Are Arguments About Legitimacy Legitimate?
The arguments about institutional litigation have a distinctive point/
counterpoint ring to them as detractors and supporters play off of each
94. Id at 395.
95. Glenn, supra, note 26.
96. Id at 264. ('The judiciary (particularly the elitist one of the common law tradition) is thus
not a force of police, and the entire corpus of civil or private law is revealed, through the nature
of its enforcement mecharfism, as an optional device for acute conflict resolution").
97. Fiss 1979, supra, note 72 at 43.
98. Id at 44.
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other's debating marks: give them a chance, their effectiveness will earn
them credit - they should not be used, the probability of error is too
great; they are devoid of consent - their validity depends not on
specified consent but on their unique competence; they offend against
division of powers because they re-order public spending - when they
do so, they are not significantly different than any order against
government which always has allocative consequences. On both sides the
arguments are eloquent and vigorous. Both have combed the case law
searching for that which is supportive and for that which weakens if not
explained. Both have drawn on larger sets of social, political, and
historical arguments with which to embroider and bolster their positions.
So how are we to know who sees clearly and who is myopic?
At a first level one is struck by an element largely missing on both sides
despite the elaborateness and force of each. Scarcely any of the
commentators refer to or call for evaluative and follow up studies of
courts' actual performances. I do not suggest that empirical studies can
settle all normative debates but they can often narrow the range of
differences by unearthing and testing the factual allegations embedded in
opposing arguments.9 9 Chayes' plea for a trial period in order to allow
decrees an opportunity to validate their existence and Horowitz'
opposition based on the probability of error are basically premised on
factual components - really diametrically opposed allegations.
Similarly, arguments concerning institutional remedies as disruptive of
the public fisc again turn, at least partially, on unexplored factual
contentions. There is little known, in any event as has surfaced in the
legal literature on legitimacy, about how much these orders cost, whether
some are more financially demanding than others, how often they have
caused a substantial shift in public spending programs and the
consequences when they have done so.
There are few comprehensive evaluative studies of these decrees.,, In
the end, have courts brought prisons into constitutional conformity? Has
discrimination ended in schools subject to the orders and when it has, at
what costs?' 01 Has the blight of discrimination been eradicated at the
99. Debate about the utility of empiricism in the study of law and legal institutions is lively,
particularly, within the law and society movement. See, for example, Macaulay, Law and the
BehavioralSciences: Is There Any There? (1984), 6 Law & Policy 149; Trubeck, Where the
Action Is: Critical Legal Studies and Empiricism (1984), 36 Stan L. Rev. 575; Bogart,
Empirical Studies and ProceduralLaw: The Law, In Fact (1985), paper presented to the
Canadian Law and Society Association - unpublished.
100. For one brief attempt, see Schuck, Suing Government - Citizens Remediesfor Official
Wrongs (1983), 154 et seq.
101. I have not conducted a comprehensive search in the social sciences literature. One of the
points I am making here is that to the extent that evaluative studies exist at all they have not
figured prominently or even peripherally in the bulk of the legitimacy literature. For attempts
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price of quality?10 2 When the decrees have worked and been successful
103
(having decided the measure of success), what fs made them so?
When they have failed (calling for a similar definitional exercise) are
there common aspects to the failure? Is their success noticeably different
when compared with success or failure of courts' orders in traditional
litigation? Could it be that such careful and inclusive examination would
reveal patterns, that effectiveness or its absence depend on a mix of
factors not solely - or even principally - determined by the personality
and vision of the judge 1°4
But there is another -

I think a deeper -

level at which arguments

over legitimacy ought to be examined. Institutional litigation and its
remedies are not some legal satellite orbitting on its own. However
convincing historical arguments about continuity and comparisons with
other procedural forms that challenge the classical paradigm, there is at
least enough there to show that it belongs to a world of law which has
been undergoing a continuing shift away from a focus centered upon a
concept of individuals ordering their lives in relation to other individuals
viewing each largely in terms of economic and property rights, towards
one where large aggregates of power exercise their domain and where
individuals -

even the strongest of us -

are a weak voice. It is no

coincidence that institutional litigation does not focus on the protection of
property rights, the task- long held sacred to the law. Thus, the
controversy over institutional decrees cannot be confined to a debate
about the compass of remedial law. It spreads, as it must, to a broader
to discuss ,whatmight be involved in assessing decrees from a psychological perspective, see:
Miller and Brewer (eds.) Groups in Contact" The Psychology of Desegregation (1984) and
Cook Experimenting in Social Issues - The Case of School Desegregation (1985), 40
American Psychologist 452.
102. In the context of school cases, two recent newspaper accounts have evaluated positively - two desegregation decrees in Buffalo and Boston respectively, see: Winerip,
"School Integration in Buffalo is Hailed as a Model for U.S." New York Times Monday, May
13, 1985, 1 and Wald, "Judge in Bias Case is Ceding Control Over Boston Schools" New York
imes Thursday, August 22, 1985, 1.
103. A recent article argues that one of the most important factors in a desegregation remedy
is the "white flight" phenomenon and contends that element must be taken into account when
fashioning a remedy in the first place: Gewirtz, Remedies andResistance (1983), 92 Yale Law
Journal 585 at 660 ("Although grappling with imperfection may be difficult, it is part of the
difficulty of the remedial problem, of translating ideals into something real that makes the
world somewhat better for at least some people. To reject the imperfect may preserve the
horrible").
104. The best single attempt of which I am aware to draw together the empirical studies in
school desegregation plans is Rossell, Applied Social Science Research. What Does It Say

About the Effectiveness of School Desegregation Plans (1983), 12 J. of Leg. Studies 69 in
which she concludes that the costs of desegregation do not overshadow possible benefits. What
she does emphasize (69) is how few and limited are the studies and the inaccessibility of those
that do exist.
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discussion of how far the courts should go in recognizing and protecting
new interests many - but not all - of which will be constitutional.
Therefore, we must debate the extent to which courts should umpire even if not exclusively - the interlock of the person and the institution.
I do not believe I have a romantic notion of Canadian judges. They
have been conservative - even reactionary; they have been superficial
even inept. I was no compaigner for the Charteras the path towards
a sun-drenched order with judges our hearty trailblazers. But the presence
or absence of the Charter would not have altered the incontrovertible
presence of large institutions in Canadian daily life and the power which
they exercise.
The Charteris here and suggestions that it will somehow shrivel away
are the meanderings of the desperate. What may be romantic on my part
is the belief that courts will be legitimated if they use this power to protect
the weakest and frail among us - that they shift even as society has. Of
course, this marks me as a supporter of broad remedial orders when, after
all else, they must be resorted to. And that is a position that is just a
corner of what will, and must be, part of a large and ongoing controversy
about the Charter.But as we fight about the role of the court and the
scope of its remedial authority, we should face the fact that at its core the
debate is about power and the way it can be shifted by courts 5and not
10
about some fixed and predetermined essence concerning judges.
It is not coincidence that some critics on both the right and the left
have little enthusiasm for judicial power. The right fears judicial power as
the great equalizer, the giver of a voice to those shut out of other
processes where power and influence take a commanding lead. 0 6 The left
sees the authority of judges identified with the established order allowing
just enough change, just enough recognition of the most extreme
injustices to shore up the system and allow it to continue on its way.1 07
Those are stark descriptions but in a sense both are right. To litigate is
to act conservatively. When people sue they acknowledge the system but
also register faith in it and its capacity to do justice. To sue is not to
challenge the established order but it is to voice one's expectations about
it. And where individuals sue who have been excluded from other
governmental processes, expectations about the system and its capacity to
turn itself around are likely at their highest. It should not be surprising,
therefore, that questions concerning the need for courts to place
themselves between the individual and large aggregates of power should
105. Eisenberg and Yeazell, supra,note 43 at 514.
106. See, for example, Glenn, supra, note 26.
107. See, for example, Freeman, LegitimizingRacialDiscriminationThrough Antidiscrimination
Law: A CriticalReview of Supreme CourtDoctrine (1978), 62 Minnesota Law Review 1049.
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be among the most controversial that we can discuss. What is amazing is
that there is a continual attempt to disguise and mask such questions
behind a fog of legal doctrine or, more immediately, to suggest that
arguments about the remedial role of courts must be driven by a debate
about what constitutes the inherent nature of judges.
Controversy about courts and their remedial role should flourish. But
it should do so as part of a larger discussion about what rights and values
our society should recognize and protect. To what extent law does and
can transform us - altering as values assert themselves and gain
recognition but also imposing its own order and expectations of our
conduct and relations. And the debate should be one not skewed by a
vision of what courts did -

distant and different past.

08

or what we thought they did -

in some

i08. Gewirtz, supra, note 103 at 680 ("Law can be adequately understood only by
recognizing how the ideal and the real influence it simultaneously").

